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BSE: Risk, Uncertainty, and Policy Change
Enda Cummins, Pat Grace, John Fry, Kevin McDonnell, &
Shane Ward*
Introduction
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) is a member of the
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSEs) of which scrapie in
sheep and Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) in humans are well known
examples. The recognition of the BSE agent as a possible cause of a new
variant of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD) in humans and
confirmation data indicating that a link between vCJD and BSE does
exist placed BSE in the public arena.1 The present rates of vCJD in
Great Britain highlight the significance of exposure risk to the BSE
agent in man.
The term "risk society" has been used to describe the situation
where a risk can have an effect, not on one particular individual, but on
an entire community. In our "risk society," a range of potential risks
and uncertainties are associated with new technologies and new diseases
such as BSE. These risks bring with them worries about human health,
industrial competitiveness, ecological disruption, and the potential for
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trade disputes. In an ever changing society, the ability to manage new
health scares is an essential skill for governments and related industries.
Government has the job of ensuring safety for consumers, the general
public, and protection of the environment. This involves making
informed decisions about potential effects on human health, ecology,
and the countryside more generally.
BSE, which reached epidemic proportions in Great Britain in the
late 1980s, resulted from the feeding of infected meat and bone meal
(MBM) to ruminant animals. 2 When an animal is processed through
a meat factory, the carcass is partitioned and those parts of the animal
that are not utilized for human consumption are separated (largely bone
and intestine tissues). The resulting material is rendered in specialized
rendering plants by a number of crushing and cooking stages. The
resulting solid material is termed MBM while the liquid material is
called tallow (essentially animal fat). The rendering of offal from BSE-
infected cattle gave rise to a spiralling effect of infectivity in animal
feed resulting in increasingly larger numbers of cattle becoming
infected with BSE in Great Britain in the early 1980s. It is suggested
that the early cycles began because a novel TSE agent originated in the
early 1970s. The cause of the novel agent is likely to have been a new
prion 3 mutation in cattle or possibly sheep. 4 The recycling nature
of the feeding practices at that time gave rise to an amplification effect
that produced the BSE epidemic seen in Great Britain in the late 1980s.
This paper develops a systems modelling approach to the risk
assessment of BSE transmission in the food/feed chain, which assesses
the effectiveness of policy change in curtailing the epidemic.
Risk Assessment
Risk assessment has emerged as a valuable analytical tool for
describing the public health consequences of human exposure to
environmental contaminants. It is a widely used method of
characterizing hazards, and in doing so, allaying or compounding fears
2 John W. Wilesmith et al., Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy: Epidemiological Studies,
130 Veterinary Record 90 (1988).
3 A prion is a small glycosylated protein molecule found in the brain cell membrane. In its
abnormal state, the prion becomes heat resistant and protease-resistant.
4 BSE Inquiry, Volume 1, Findings and Conclusions ch. 12, Science and Research 219
(2000) (available at <http://wvw.bse.org.uk/>).
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of the hazard while increasing the probability of project success by
decreasing the degree of project risk. Risk assessment is a decision-
making process that entails the integration of political, social, economic,
and engineering information with risk-related data to develop, analyze,
and compare regulatory options and to select the appropriate regulatory
response to a potential health hazard. The selection process necessarily
requires the use of value judgments on such issues as the acceptability of
risk and the reasonableness of the control costs. Risk assessment
techniques have been used to monitor and analyze the future course of
BSE and provide estimates of biological parameters to assess the risks to
both animal and human health. 5 Risk assessment procedures have
been used in many countries to assess the incidense of BSE infected
animals and the resulting risks to humans.6
Science faces a fundamental difficulty in assessing the risks, control
measures, and costs associated with the emergence of a new and
relatively unknown disease. As a result, many uncertainties exist. In
light of this, scientists are faced with two possible options: (1) conduct
experiments to generate new information; or (2) make informed
assessments about the potential effects of the disease. The onus is put
on scientists to provide the information required for informed
commercial and political decisions. Risk assessment can be used to
assist in this process.
During the 1970s, legal and administrative challenges led to the
adoption of risk assessment and its ability to highlight the need for
policy changes as a means of protecting human health. International
trade agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
have requirements for risk assessment in their sanitary and
phytosanitary (S&P) clauses. 7 Such agreements highlight the growing
need for risk assessment methodologies in trade situations. Risk
5 Enda J. Cummins et al., Predictive Modelling and Risk Assessment of BSE: A Review,
4(3) Journal of Risk Research 251 (200 1).
6 Det Norske Veritas (DNV) technical, Risks from BSE via Environmental Pathways,
Report to Environment Agency Ref C7243 (June 1997).
7 See Michael Wooldridge er al., "I Don't Want To Be Told What To Do By a
Mathematical Formula" Overcoming Adverse Perceptions of Risk Analysis, Proceedings of
The Society for Veterinary Epidemiology and Preventative Medicine 37-47 (1996); North
American Free Trade Agreement, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures ch. 7, section B
(1993).
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assessment is used as a valuable tool in decision making while
highlighting control strategies that may be required or any need for
policy change. Risk assessment procedures and methodologies have
been reviewed in the context of BSE by Cummins et al. 8
Stages in Risk Assessment
Risk assessments can characterize the fundamental risks and
uncertainties associated with the potential impacts of BSE on the food
and feed chain. There are four main stages in the risk assessment
process. These steps include hazard identification, exposure assessment,
dose-response assessment, and risk characterization. The aim is to
reduce the probability and impact of the disease by combining the
information from each of the four steps.
Hazard Identification
The collection of data relating to the disease (i.e., BSE) is carried
out during the hazard identification stage. Epidemiological and disease
surveillance data are collected describing the factors which contribute to
the disease's survival, mode of transmission, and growth. Hazard
identification focuses on what can go wrong and how it would happen.
Exposure Assessment
The data collected in the hazard identification stage is used in
assessing the potency with which the disease can infect others taking
into account possible critical points which may act as a control point to
halt the disease, hasten its inactivation, or reduce exposure. The
pathways, by which the disease challenges a potential host, are
identified during this stage. The initial dose may also have an impact
on disease efficacy; thus, it must be assessed during exposure
assessment. Exposure assessment evaluates the likelihood of these
hazards occurring and its resulting implications.
Dose-Response Assessment
If a host has been exposed to a pathogen, its response will vary
depending on the amount of pathogen it is subjected to. A dose-
response is used to translate the exposure assessment into a response in
8 See Cummins et al., supra n. 5.
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terms of infected host animals. The susceptibility/immunity of the host
has to be taken into account.
Risk Characterization
The information generated from all the previous steps is
incorporated in the risk characterization step. Uncertainty about the
value of any input parameter used in the preceding stages can be
incorporated here by means of probability distributions. This allows the
effects of variations in these input parameters on the risk calculation to
be ascertained. This can point to deficiencies in research data or current
knowledge and direct future research efforts to correct this. This stage
provides scientific basis for policy decisions.
BSE Risk Modeling
Risk assessment models and analyses have been used as tools to help
manage risk and to help make policy decisions. Researchers have put a
number of research documents and policy consultation responses
forward in relation to BSE. In particular, works by Anderson et al. and
Ferguson et al. have been significant to the formulation of BSE control
strategies and policy within the European Union and the calculation of
risk in terms of the human consumption of contaminated meat and
meat products. 9 These policies have had a significant impact on the
importing and exporting of goods to and from European countries for
the facilitation of trade.
The construction of a model for the purpose of a quantitative risk
assessment is essential in supporting or initiating policy decisions. 10 In
its simplest form, a risk assessment model of BSE can be broken-up into
two inputs: (1) disease model inputs; and (2) herd model inputs.
Further analysis reveals that the factors at play and their interaction
with one another are quite complex. This highly complex set of factors
interact to create an environment for BSE to establish in a herd and
contribute to human food risks. The most important factors that need
to be taken into account in a risk assessment of BSE are given in Figure
1.
9 Roy M. Anderson et al., Transmission Dynamics and Epidemiology of BSE in British
Cattle, 382 Nature 779 (1996); Neill M. Ferguson et al., The Epidemiology of BSE in GB
Cattle Herds: II. Model Construction and Analysis of the Transmission Daynamics, 352
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society London B 808 (1997).
10 See Wooldridge et al., supra n. 7.
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Figure 1
Risk Assessment Factors for BSE
Disease Model Inputs Herd Model Inputs
Hazard Identification Exposure Assessment Dose Response
Epidemiological Animal Rendering Feed Industry Demographhy/Herd
Parameters Physiology Industry Inclusion rate management
Incubation Infected Heat treatment ofCvIBM Herd size
period tissues Pressure Fraction fed Birth rate
Infectiousness Oral doses treatment to bovines - Cull rates
Transmission Time exposed Feed stored Imported animals





The first stage in the risk assessment process (hazard identification)
includes the identification of the BSE agent along with any
epidemiological and surveillance data. Epidemiological parameters such
as the incubation period and the method of transmission will contribute
to disease persistence. A longer incubation period will result in a
prolonged epidemic while control strategies will take longer before they
will have a noticeable effect. The feed risk is very much dependent on
rendering and feed industries. Within the rendering industry, the raw
material used and the process condition applied contribute to the
overall feed risk, while within the feed industry, the inclusion rate of
MBM (domestic and imported) and the potential for cross
contamination add to the feed risk. The herd structure and dynamics
of the host population are important in terms of herd size, age
distribution, and animal cull rates. The susceptibility of the host
population to a given dose of infected tissue is assessed in the dose
response relationship. With BSE, one infected animal has the potential
to infect many more animals provided that the oral dose to an
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individual animal is sufficient to cause infection. All of these factors
lead to the development of a combined risk assessment of BSE
incidences. This information is used to facilitate the implementation of
disease control policies in an effort to reduce disease incidence and
protect human and animal health.
The effect of the control policies is not always obvious from the
back calculation techniques used by Anderson et al., Ferguson et al.,
and Donnelly et al. due to their complexity; while in many instances
the techniques used are merely for biological parameter estimations.1 1
While the factors detailed in Figure 1 have been used in many risk
assessment approaches, the systems modelling approach may be easier
for an unfamiliar public to comprehend the main components of
detailed risk assessment procedures. To facilitate an easier
understanding of the factors at play and the policies implemented in
response to the BSE crises, a systems modelling approach has been
developed here.
System Modeling Approach to BSE Risk Assessment
A systems model integrates and predicts the effects of a series of
individual components which interact to form a coherent system. For
the development of a BSE model, the overall system can be broken-
down into a number of different components. Examples include the
feed industry, rendering industry, slaughter plant, host population, and
imports/exports. A systems modeling approach to risk assessment
represents an approach that is robust, systematic, and transparent in
terms of the assumptions made and systems that are modeled. The
following types of systems are proposed in this paper: (1) Closed
System Model (Figure 2), where the main cause for concern is from
potentially infected animals produced internally with little or no
imports to the system; and (2) Open System Model (Figure 3), where
the importation of potentially infected animals and animal feed is the
main concern as a source of infection.
11 Christl A. Donnelly et al., The Epidemiology of BSE in Great Britain Cattle Herds: L
Epidemiological Processes, Demography of Cattle and Approaches to Control by Culling, 352
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society London B 781 (1997); see Anderson et al.,
supra n. 9; Ferguson et al., supra n. 9.
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Figure 2
Closed System Model of BSE
Figure 3
Open System Model of BSE
Control policy 1: Active surveillance measures for the detection, control
and eradication of BSE, as of May 1, 1998 (Decision 98/272 April 1998).
The introduction of targeted testing for BSE, with a focus on high-risk
animal categories, from January 1, 2001. This measure will be reviewed
and extended to all cattle aged over 30 months entering the food chain
from July 1, 2001 (Decision 2000/374 June 2000).
Control policy 2: The requirement to remove, from the human food
chain, specified high-risk materials (SRMs like spinal cord, brain, eyes,
tonsils, parts of the intestines) from cattle, sheep, and goats throughout the
EU from October 1, 2000 (Decision 2000/418 June 2000).
Control policy 3: The requirement to remove specified high-risk
materials from cattle, sheep, and goats throughout the EU from October
1, 2000 from the animal feed chain (Decision 2000/418 June 2000).
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Control policy 4: Higher processing standards for the treatment of
animal waste (133 degrees Celsius, 3 bars of pressure for twenty minutes)
in order to reduce infectivity to a minimum (Decision 96/449 July 1996).
Control policy 5: A ban on the feeding of mammalian meat and bone
meal (MBM) to cattle, sheep, and goats, as of June 1994 (Decision 94/381
June 1994).
Control policy 6: Great Britain shall not export, from its territory to
other Member States or third countries, bovine animals and bovine
products (Decision 96/239 March 1996).
Control policy 7: Great Britain shall not export, to other member states,
live cattle born before July 18, 1988 or born females in which bovine
spongiform encephalopathy is suspected or has been officially confirmed
(Decision 89/469 July 1989).
Details of all these control policies and others relating to European BSE
legislation can be located at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/food/
fs~bse/bse 15 en.pdf. In addition, there are country specific measures in
force in several European Union member states, especially those with the
highest incidence of BSE.
In the Open System Model, there are two possible routes of
introduction of infection: (1) infected cattle; or (2) importation of
infected MBM. The transportation of animals and their products
between communities has long been recognized as having the potential
to spread infection. 1 2 A Closed System Model of BSE in Great
Britain, which shows the feedback loop required to initiate a BSE
epidemic, is given in Figure 2. It is the simplest representation of what
happened in Great Britain to give rise to the BSE epidemic.
While the BSE agent has been identified in relatively few tissues of
infected cattle, 13 the available methods of detection cannot rule out
the possibility that other tissues may also contain the BSE infection.
Furthermore, cattle tissues are used in several products and
manufacturing processes which could potentially result in human
exposure. Current processing strategies are not able to completely
eliminate the BSE agent from food products. Therefore, BSE risk
assessment in the food industry rests on knowing the source and BSE
incidence of cattle used in food production, the tissues involved, and
the consumption patterns of the final product.
12 See Wooldridge et al., supra n. 7.
13 Scientific Steering Committee of the European Commission, Listing of Specified Risk
Materials: A Scheme for AssessingRelative Risks to Man (opinion adopted December 9, 1997).
13 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 95 [Spring 2002]
In the early 1980s, if a subclinical animal was present in the host
population and was culled, offal from this animal would have been
rendered and converted into MBM and fed back to the host population
in the form of a protein rich feed. While this cycle of events gave rise to
the BSE epidemic as we know it today, policy makers have attempted
to renew public confidence in the food industry by laying down strict
control strategies/policies to curtail this disease.
BSE Control Policies
Given the importance of beef in the human diet and the use of
bovine tissues in the manufacture of household, industrial, agricultural,
and pharmaceutical products, professionals must implement interim
control measures until our knowledge of TSE is complete. The main
polices that the European Commission has put in place to control BSE
and protect consumers can be viewed as a series of control policies.
These are then used in the systems models of BSE developed in this
paper (see Figure 2 and 3).
BSE Model Structure
The model developed in this paper demonstrates that the policies in
place create a number of obstacles should the infection be introduced
into the system. The question is how effective are these obstacles? If
some of the infection gets through each stage, there may be some
degree of risk to human and animal health. The effectiveness of each of
these control policies needs to be quantitatively assessed and updated if
future scientific information deems there is a deficiency in the system.
The efficiency of the cumulative effects of the control policies to
eliminate infectivity can be measured by the product of each of the
efficiencies of the control policies within the system. For example,
within a closed system (e.g., neglecting imported feed) the efficiency of
the control policies can be measured by Equations 1 and 2 below.
The equation Animal Riskj represents a measure of the risk to
animals internally in the closed system. It is comparable to the basic
reproduction ratio (R0 ), which is the fundamental epidemiological
quantity determining if an infectious disease will persist in a host
population. 14 R0 is defined as the average number of new infections
14 Roy M. Anderson & Robert M. May, Infectious Diseases of Humans (Oxford University
Press 1991).
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caused by a typical infective individual during its total infectious period
in a fully susceptible population. If R0 remains below 1, an epidemic
will not occur. If, however, R0 is greater than 1 (i.e., one infected
animal will infect more than one other animal) a disease outbreak
would occur. It is a simple and convenient measurement of risk. The
equation Human Risk, represents a method of measuring the risk to
humans in a closed system. It is the average number of new human
infections caused by an infected animal.
Equation 1:
Animal Riski = CP1*CP3*CP4*CP5 * Y(1)
Equation 2:
Human Risk i = CP1*CP2*Y/B(2)
CP1 is the fraction of subclinical cases entering a slaughter plant
unrecognized as diseased animals.
CP2 is the fraction of material with the potential infectivity, which enters
the human food chain.
CP3 is the fraction of material with potential to infect that enters the
rendering industry.
CP4 is the fraction of infection which survives the rendering process.
CP5 is the fraction of MBM which is used for animal feed.
Y is the infection level in an infected animal measured in cattle oral ID50
(i.e., the infectivity required to induce infection in a bovine animal when
exposed orally (CoID 50/Animal)), and B is the species barrier factor. The
species barrier is a term used to describe the natural resistance to transmission
when a particular species is exposed to a TSE of another species. It enables a
conversion from CoID50 to human ID50.
If an infected animal or MBM is imported, the risk posed is very
much dependent on the control policies in place in the source country.
This would be of importance in a country where the potential for
infection is largely from imported material and is represented by the
Open System Model (Figure 3). The risk to humans and animals is
dependent on control policies in both the importing and the exporting
countries and is represented by Equations 3, 4, and 5. Animal Risk E,
MBM (Equation 3) results from the importation of MBM (i.e., live
animals are slaughtered and processed in the source country then the
MBM material is imported to the destination country). It is the risk
from an external (E) source of MBM.
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Equation 3:
Animal RiskE, MBM = CPle * CP3e * CP4e * CP5i * CP6i * Y(3)
Equation 4:
Animal RiskE, A = CP1i * CP3i * CP4j * CP5i * CP7i * Y(4)
Equation 5:
Human RiskE= CP1j * CP2i * CP7i* Y/B(5)
CP6 is the fraction of externally produced MBM imported into the
destination country; and
CP7 is the fraction of animals imported from the total herd population.
Subscript e indicates the exporting country control policy, subscript i
indicates the importing country control policy.
Animal RiskE, A (Equation 4) results from the importation of
potentially infected animals (i.e., live animals are imported from the
source country and are slaughtered and processed in the destination
country). It is the risk from an external (E) source of animals (A).
Human RiskE is the risk to humans from imported animals.
The control policies, CP6 and CP7, are dependent on the control
measures in place in the importing country. For the control policies to
be effective (i.e. reducing risk to humans and animals), the risk
calculation for human and animal risks should be less than 1. By being
less than 1, it indicates that the control policies in place have the effect
of decreasing the disease incidence. This indicates that the policies in
place are effective in controlling the disease and that the disease would
not reach epidemic proportions. This calculation can indicate that the
control policies in place are effective and can allow for some degree of
ineffectiveness/uncertainty of a particular control policy. While Animal
Risk, is a reproduction ratio, the other calculations (Equations 2, 3, 4,
and 5) are variations of this reproduction ratio calculation as applied to
a type of system (open or closed) and a species type (human or bovine).
They serve as a convenient risk measurement. Ireland can be considered
representative of an open system model as it trades with Great Britain
and, hence, the greatest source of initial infection was from imported
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feed or animals while the greatest risks to Great Britain were from
internal sources (i.e., Closed Model System). Parameters from Great
Britain and Ireland were used in the model calculations. The input
parameters and their sources are given in Table 1.
Table 1
Inputs for Risk Calculations for Great Britain (Closed System) and Ireland (Open System)
Input GB-1986 GB-1990 IRL-1986 IRL-1990
CP1 15 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
CP2 16  0.011 0.001 0.011 0.001
CP317  0.7 0.07 0.7 0.07
CP4 18  0.11 0.01 0.11 0.01
CP5 19  0.2 0.002 0.034 0.013
CP62 0  0.008 0.
CP72 1  0.0005 0.00004
CoID50 in a clinical animal2 2 10,000.00 10,000.00 10,000.00 10,000.00
Species barrier 2 3  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Results
Great Britain was considered to be representative of the Closed
Model System as much of the risk of infection was from within Great
Britain. Imports to Great Britain played a minor role in the spread of
15 See DNV 1997, supra n. 6.
16 Scientific Steering Committee of the European Commission, Opinion of the Scientific
Steering Committee on the Human Exposure (HER) via Food With Respect to BSE (adopted
Dec. 10, 1999).
17 Aline De Koeijer et al., Calculation of the Reproduction Ratio for BSE Infection among
Cattle (unpublished report from the Institute for Animal Science and Health 1998) (on file
with ID-DLO, P.O. Box 65, 8200 AB Lelystad, Netherlands); J.T. Cohen et al., Evaluation of
the Potential Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in the United States (Nov. 26, 2001).
18 Id.
19 Scientific Steering Committee of the European Commission, Report on the Assessment
of Geographical BSE Risk of Ireland (adopted July 2000); see Aline De Koeijer et al., supra
n. 17.
20 See Scientific Steering Committee, supra n. 19.
21 Id.
22 Scientific Steering Committe of the European Commission, Opinion on Oral Exposure
of Humans to the BSE Agent: Infective Doses and Species Barrier (adopted April 13 & 14
2000).
23 Id.
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the disease. Ireland was considered representative of an Open System
Model as it traded with Great Britain, hence, the greatest source of
initial infection was from imported feed or animals. Based on animal
survival curves for infected and non-infected animals, it was estimated
that approximately 70% of infected animals would be culled before
exhibiting clinical signs (CP1 = 0.7). After the introduction of active
surveillance, the number of subclinical animals entering the factory
would be reduced. However, it is difficult to estimate the extent with
which the subclinical numbers are reduced hence CP1 is assumed,
pessimistically, to be 0.7 for all years. The main source of infection for
humans is exposure from consumption of SRM or of meat products
containing SRM. Foods such as sausages, mince, meat stuffed pasta,
pate, and beef burgers may have contained SRM while many
components of the SRM list have been consumed as gourmet foods in a
number of countries. 2 4 SRM (i.e., brain, spinal cord, trigeminal
ganglia, dorsal root ganglia, illeum, spleen and eyes) carries about 99%
of the infectivity in a clinical BSE case, hence the exclusion of SRM
from the food/feed chain reduces the risk of infection significantly. For
the 1986 risk calculation for humans, the risk was calculated on the
basis that all the SRM from an animal could have been consumed (i.e.,
CP2 = 1) while decreasing to negligible amounts in latter years due to
the exclusion of SRM. The fraction of material with potential
infectivity that enters the rendering industry (i.e., CP3) and fraction of
infectivity which survives the rendering process (i.e., CP4) were taken
from Cohen et al., who give estimates of the effectiveness of various
rendering systems at inactivating the BSE agent.2 5 The fraction of
MBM allocated to cattle for Great Britain was also taken from De
Koeijer et al. In Ireland, CP5 was estimated from data supplied by the
Scientific Steering Committee who gives figures for the production of
MBM in Ireland (approximately 70,000 tons). 2 6 Imports of MBM
given in the Irish country dossier gave figures between the years 1980
and 1987. In 1987, 2,400 tons were used in ruminant rations giving a
CP5 of 0.034 for Ireland. In 1989, the amount of MBM used in
ruminant rations was around 960 tons, resulting in the decrease in CP5
24 Scientific Steering Committee of the European Commission, supra n. 16.
25 See Cohen et al., supra n. 17.
26 See Scientific Steering Committee, supra n. 19.
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of 0.013 for Ireland. This decrease is the result of the control policies
that were put in place. The total imports of MBM from Great Britain
by Ireland ranged from 1,000 to 2,500 tons per annum between 1980
and 1987. However, investigations by the Irish government's
Department of Agriculture, Food and Rural Development concluded
that no MBM was imported and that numbers given were as a result of
tariff code misclassification. Between 1926 and 1986, importation of
MBM from Great Britain was subject to license, and very few licenses
were issued. For the purposes of the model, 2,500 tons was taken as
representative of the quantity imported by Ireland during the 1980s.
The total MBM produced by Great Britain was 300,000 tons,27 giving
CP6 equal to 0.008. Since 1989, the importation of MBM from Great
Britain was prohibited, hence, a reduction in the risk from imports to
negligible amounts. 2 8 The European Unions Scientific Steering
Committee, as a worst case assumption, assumes that 5% (i.e., of
twenty animals imported, one could have been infected and this
number would be reduced by a multiple of 100 after 1998), of live
exports from Great Britain between 1988 and 1993 were infected with
BSE. 2 9 After 1998, of the 2,000 animals imported, one could be
infected. Official statistics recorded imports from great Britain as 6,407
cattle in 1988-1990 and 488 cattle in 1991-1993.
In 1986, it was clear that the policies in place in Great Britain were
not effective in reducing BSE risk, as indicated by the fact that the
calculated risks (i.e., Animal RiskI , Human Risk,) as shown in Table 2,
were greater than 1. This indicates the strong potential for further
infections of animals and humans in Great Britain. In 1986, on average,
the number of animal infections caused by an infected animal in Great
Britain would have been ten animals (Table 2). This figure compares
well with an estimate of nine animals (upper confidence interval of 10)
by Ferguson et al. for the same year.3 0 The number of potentially
infected humans resulting from an infected animal would have been 70
27 Scientific Steering Committee of the European Commission, Report on the Assessment
of the Geographical BSE-Risk of the United Kingdom (July 2000).
28 See Scientific Steering Committee, supra n. 19.
29 Id.
30 Neill M. Ferguson et al., Estimation of the Basic Reproduction Number of BSE: The
Intensity of Transmission in British Cattle, 266 Proceedings of the Royal Society London B 23
(1999).
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as shown in Table 2. By 1990, the risk to animals and humans has
greatly reduced (0.7) due to the control policies that were put in place.
The calculated risk is significantly less than 1, indicating a decrease in
the epidemic and consequent decrease in the resulting risk of infection
while confirming the effectiveness of the control policies that were put
in place to curtail the disease.
Table 2
Risk Calculation Results: Average Number of New Infections Generated From One Infected
Animal Given the Controls in Place in Great Britain and Ireland at That Time.
Calculation GB-1986 GB-1990 IRL-1986 IRL-1990
Animal Risk I 10.164 0.001 1.833 0.006
Animal Risk E, MBM 0.015 0.000
Animal Risk E, A 0.0009 0.000
Human Risk I 70.0 0.700 70.000 0.700
Human Risk E, A 0.035 0.000
It is clear that Ireland, which represented an Open System Model,
was particularly vulnerable in the early 1980s in terms of risk from
imported animals and feed. The potential number of new infections
caused by an infected animal was 1.8. Being greater than 1, policy
changes were required to ensure this went below 1. The average number
of new infections created in Ireland by an infected animal in Great
Britain via importing feed containing MBM from Great Britain would
have been 0.015 animals while the number of infections in Ireland
caused, via an imported animal, would have been 0.0009 animals (i.e.,
only when cases in the Great Britain were over 1,111 would Ireland be
at risk from imported animals). The control policies are shown to
greatly reduce the risk in a Closed Model System and an Open Model
System in 1990.
Integration of Uncertainty into the Model
Scientific judgments on risks and uncertainties are underpinned and
framed by unavoidably subjective assumptions about the nature,
magnitude, and relative importance of these uncertainties. These
"framing assumptions" can have an overwhelming effect on the results
obtained in risk assessments. This partly explains why different risk
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assessments on the same issue can obtain widely varying results, even
though each has apparently been conducted in accordance with the
tenets of "sound science."
The issues of uncertainty are now subject to a well-developed
academic field of study and comment. A model could contain inputs
and outputs in the form of probabilities or frequency distributions.
Implicit in this structure are potential sources of uncertainty and
variability. Anand emphasizes the uncertainty surrounding BSE and
further emphasizes the lack of research into risk and risk
communication throughout the crisis.3 1 It is of critical importance
when calculating risk that the adoption of assumptions be justified. The
existing system for gathering scientific opinion should be
complemented by a process for analyzing the subjective framing
assumptions used in a risk assessment. Models are based on
assumptions. In this assessment, the assumption is made that the same
MBM processing conditions existed for Great Britain as in Ireland. The
infectious load used in this analysis was 1,000 CoID50 per animal (a
fully infected animal has the potential to infect 10,000 other animals
with a 50% success rate given that the animals are orally exposed to the
BSE agent). This represents the infection level in a clinically infected
animal. However, this analysis is used to represent the infection in a
subclinical animal. This is a very pessimistic assumption as infectivity
grows exponentially in the six months prior to onset of clinical
symptoms; hence, subclinical animals have significantly lower infectivity
levels and represent a lower risk to human and animal health than an
animal exhibiting clinical syptoms. 32 To date, little is known about the
ability of the BSE agent to infect humans, a species barrier of 100 was
taken in this analysis, but this may be as high as 1000. 3 3 The
assumptions taken are pessimistic and often estimate the upper end of
the risks from BSE to human and animal health.
Uncertainty analysis provides a systematic and transparent tool for
exploring assumptions in risk assessment procedures. Monte Carlo and
other probabilistic analytical techniques provide a relatively
31 Paul Anand, Chronic Uncertainty and BSE Communications: Lessons from (and limits
o]) Decision Theory in The Mad Cow Crisis 51 (Ratzan ed., UCL Press 1998).
32 Christl A. Donnelly & Neill M. Ferguson, Statistical Aspects of BSE and vCJD: Models
for Epidemics (CRC Press 1999); see also Anderson et al., supra n. 9.
33 See Scientific Steering Committee, supra n. 19.
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straightforward method to parameterise variability and uncertainty.
They fully acknowledge uncertainties and can include a multitude of
factors included in a risk assessment. In this way, risk assessment can
aid deliberation and reasoned judgment. These methods can assist in
bringing to light different ways of interpreting scientific advice in the
regulation of risks such as those in relation to BSE.
Conclusions
Implementation of a systematic risk assessment process prepares the
food industry and consumers to accommodate new BSE research
findings and changing disease patterns towards the goal of protecting
human health. The larger political context within which policy
developments are situated is how to make decisions in the face of
uncertainties while at the same time implementing precautionary
approaches under commercial and trade pressures. The System Model
Approach developed here highlights the effectiveness of the control
policies put in place to curtail the BSE disease. The System Modeling
Approach is intuitive detailing the main policies taken in response to the
BSE crisis and it facilitates easier communication of the risk factors to a
largely confused public. The System Model Approach shows that the
policies put in place, if properly implemented, will significantly reduce
the risk to human and animal health in both Closed and Open System
Models.
It is imperative that decision-makers understand policy formation
and rationale in order to anticipate and react to changes which directly
or indirectly impact the health-care environment. With past experience
of BSE and other food safety issues, it seems reasonable for people to
harbor doubts regarding the reliability of regulatory science. The BSE
crisis raised the issues of the unnaturalness of some practices within
agriculture, the failure of institutions to act to prevent them, the long-
term consequences to human, and animal well-being and our inability
to avoid the resulting risks.
Risk assessment is an essential tool in increasing our knowledge
regarding various food hazards. It helps to identify environmental
problems and is frequently vital in helping to solve these problems and
influence government decisions. Risk assessment methods need to be
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maintained and enhanced. The System Model Approach developed
here enables a closer look at policy processes governing food safety and
their effects on risks from BSE. The potential for an infected animal to
infect other animals was greatly reduced in both Great Britain and
Ireland as a result of policy changes. These policy changes also enabled
Ireland to protect human and animal health from imports (e.g., MBM
and live animals) which may be potentially infected. The model
highlights the effectiveness of the control policies put in place in the
wake of the BSE crisis. However, only corroboration, by changes in
actual incidences, can fully validate adherence to tle policies. The
model also maintains a central role for scientific information and
analysis as it emerges.
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